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Abstract 
Historically, there are many examples of countries that have had to deal with the unpleasant 
consequences of economic mismanagement. A recent example is Venezuela, which has imploded 
into hyperinflation. It is therefore important to consider the question of fiscal sustainability in the 
South African context. This study ultimately aimed to test the sustainability of South Africa’s 
fiscal policy and public debt, with fiscal policy defined as the satisfaction of the intertemporal 
budget constraint. The Augmented Dickey–Fuller test was used to assess the stationarity of 
national government revenue and national government expenditure – both expressed as 
percentages of GDP – while the Engle–Granger test was used to test the residuals of the regression 
between national government revenue and national government expenditure for a long-run 
relationship. A long-run relationship was found between these two variables, suggesting that fiscal 
policy and South Africa’s public debt are sustainable. However, due to weakened institutions, the 
South African government should remain aware that the country’s fiscal policy could easily move 
into unsustainable territory.             
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1. Introduction 
There has been an intense focus on the subject of fiscal sustainability in recent years. The explosion 
of public debt as a result of the financial crisis in mid-2008 resulted in governments being forced 
to recapitalize banks, taking over the debts of large financial institutions and also introducing large 
stimulus programmes, in an attempt to resuscitate their economies. However, as the world 
economy recovered, many countries were left with large fiscal imbalances and increasing levels 
of public debt as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP). Countries with serious debt problems, 
such as Greece, required huge bailouts from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).  
Greece went on a debt spree that came crashing down in late 2009. Greece’s debt increased from 
about 100% of GDP in 2003 to about 130% of GDP in 2009. The result was an economic crisis 
that destroyed the country’s economy, brought down its government, unleashed social unrest and 
threatened the future of the euro (Karagiannis & Kondeas, 2012). However, Greece is not the only 
country that has faced potential fiscal sustainability issues or increased debt problems. The United 
States (US) as well as other European countries are sitting on enormous amounts of public debt 
and are running large fiscal deficits (see Figure 1 below).  
Figure 1: Trends in debt-to-GDP – Selected OECD countries 
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As Figure 1 shows, many developed countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios have been steadily increasing 
since the global financial crisis in 2008. Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio went from 180% in 2008 to 
about 230% in 2016, the US went from 93% in 2008 to just under 130% in 2016 and the UK went 
from just over 60% in 2008 to just under 120% in 2016. Checherita-Westphal and Jacquinot (2018) 
state that the “global financial and economic crisis has left a legacy of historically high levels of 
public debt in advanced economies”. According to the Congressional Budget Office of the US, the 
country’s federal government debt is sitting at levels not seen since World War II and is forecasted 
to reach 150% of GDP by 2047 (Bi, 2017). Similarly, and according to Fatas (2010), the increase 
in government spending by industrialised countries in general is the highest in postwar history, 
and this is at a time of relative peace in many of these countries. A number of other eurozone 
countries have also had high and potentially unsustainable levels of public debt in recent years. 
For example, Portugal and Ireland have had to borrow money from the IMF and from other 
member countries (see Nelson et al., 2011).  
The premise of my research paper is that public debt sustainability is of importance nationally and 
globally, carrying a heightened importance in recent times for both developed and emerging 
economies. However, research focusing on emerging or developing countries has been limited. 
Thus, this study was partly motivated by the fact that it would contribute to the literature by 
focusing on an emerging economy – namely, South Africa.  
This paper focusses on South Africa because the country is faced with the three-fold problem of 
poverty, inequality and a high unemployment rate, which, if not addressed, could potentially lead 
to ongoing fiscal deficits, debt unsustainability and further negative economic consequences. 
According to Statistics South Africa (StatsSA, 2014; 2015), more than half of South Africa’s 
population lives below the upper-bound poverty line of R992 per month, while 61% of income 
goes to only 20% of South Africans. Unemployment levels were at 27% as of the fourth quarter 
of 2018, with the South African economy growing at a snail’s pace of 1.3% on an annual basis 
(StatsSA, 2018). Thus, it is critical that the South African government attend to its burgeoning 
public debt in order to sustainably maintain its large social welfare policy (National Treasury, 
2017b). 
Tied to the above, this paper analyses whether the South African government will be able to meet 
its current spending, revenue and other commitments without compromising growth or defaulting 
on some of its liabilities or promised spending targets. If the government does not address its three-
fold economic crisis, it will be faced with increased expected social welfare payments and a 
reduced ability to collect tax revenue, as a result of higher unemployment; with higher expected 
expenditure and a lower tax base, the situation becomes grave. It is evident that the South African 
government needs to manage its increasing public debt, along with fostering mechanisms to 
increase its tax base, because doing so might lower social dependency on the government and 
anchor the government’s ability to sustainably maintain its social welfare policy (see also National 
Treasury, 2017b, for related perspectives). 
8 
 
Following this brief introduction, the remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
provides additional context for the social issues prevalent in South Africa that affect the country 
in general as well as its developments related to fiscal policy. Section 3 provides an overview of 
the literature that focuses on fiscal sustainability for both advanced and developing economies, 
where the objective is to highlight the different arguments and empirical evidence concerning 
fiscal sustainability for advanced and developing economies. In the same section, I present 
literature that focuses on the role of institutional frameworks and regulations on economic 
performance and tax collection. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework for assessing fiscal 
sustainability. Section 5 contains the empirical analysis and also explains the data along with the 
results. Section 6 concludes.  
2. Background: The South African context  
As mentioned, South Africa is faced with the three-fold problem of poverty, inequality and a high 
unemployment rate, all of which factors have placed a massive burden on the government, which 
has had to find ways of stimulating the economy in order to create jobs and also maintain a massive 
social security programme.  
The unemployment rate – sitting at about 27% in the first quarter of 2018 – is the highest it has 
been in 13 years (StatsSA, 2018). If the definition of unemployment is expanded to include people 
who have stopped looking for work, the unemployment rate in South Africa goes up to 36.7% 
(StatsSA, 2018). This is a dire situation, even without the potential trappings of a debt spiral.  
In addition, according to research done by Orthofer (2016), at least half of all the wealth in South 
Africa is owned by 1% of the population. The top decile combined owns 90–95% of total wealth 
and 55–60% of total income. At the same time, recent data released by Statistics South Africa 
shows that poverty is on the rise in South Africa. Despite a drop in poverty between 2006 and 
2011, the report shows that poverty levels have been on the rise again since 2011, with more than 
half of South Africans poor in 2015 (StatsSA, 2017). It is therefore imperative, in order to avoid a 
potential catastrophe, that the issue of increased public debt in South Africa is addressed sooner 
rather than later.  
Brief historical background 
When the ANC government came into power in 1994, following a democratic national election 
that was the first in the country’s history, the fiscal situation in South Africa had worsened quite 
extensively. As Ajam and Aron (2007) have pointed out, reduced revenue collection and swelling 
expenditure had resulted in growing fiscal deficits, which the incoming government inherited. This 
situation raised concerns about the issue of sustainability and the possibility of a debt trap. 
Widespread pessimism and concerns about the populist rhetoric in some quarters of the ANC 
meant that there were many people expecting dire outcomes for the country’s fiscal position 
following the new dispensation.  
South Africa has also had to deal with the pressures of globalisation, which has reduced fiscal 
policy discretion, according to Ajam and Aron (2007). The authors argue that if fiscal policy is not 
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“sound” or in accordance with the conventional wisdom, it is likely to result in foreign capital 
outflows, which puts pressure on the government to conform to global norms. In spite of these 
tough initial conditions, the South African government managed to achieve a remarkable 
improvement in its fiscal position (see Figure 2 below), at least up until the 2008 global financial 
crisis. In 1994, total gross loan as a percentage of GDP was above 40%. At its lowest, in 2009, the 
number was far lower, at about 25% debt-to-GDP – an impressive turnaround. It is important to 
note, however, that such data alone does not tell the full story because it makes it seem like there 
is a single debt cycle, with the possibility that the debt to GDP could explode in the future. 
However, the series may still be technically stationary over the period. This is an example of the 
uncertainty of statistics where there is not a sufficiently long enough series that covers several 
cycles.    
Figure 2: Trends in total debt-to-GDP – South Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Road to “sound” fiscal policy  
Calitz et al. (2009) observe that it is quite remarkable that the government was able to cut the debt 
ratio during a period of intense pressure from the newly enfranchised but poor population. 
According to Naidoo et al. (2008), since 1994, South Africa has been on a sustainable fiscal path, 
which has been a major factor in the general stability of the economy and the faster economic 
growth experienced by the country. 
Naidoo et al. (2008) state that South Africa’s policy stance can be separated into three phases. 
From 1994 to 2000, the main goal of fiscal policy was to reduce the massive budget deficit 
inherited from the apartheid government. The aim, in short, was macroeconomic stability. In the 
next period, 2000 to 2006, there was an increase in public spending, with a view to boosting 
economic growth, and the last period, which runs from 2007 onwards, has been characterised by 
a countercyclical policy stance aimed at ensuring macroeconomic stability (Naidoo et al., 2008).  
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Siebrits and van der Berg (2011) support the above contentions, stating that decreases in interest 
payments on public debt and fast revenue growth allowed the South African government to 
increase all spending categories as a share of GDP from 2001 to 2007. This is in contrast to a 
general decrease in government expenditure of 4.1% between 1995 and 2000 (Siebrits & van der 
Berg, 2011). Lending further weight to these findings, Calitz et al. (2009) observe that the period 
1985–1995 was characterised by rising debt, with the debt-to-GDP ratio increasing from 31.8% to 
50.4% during this period, before falling to 23.8% at the end of 2008. 
According to Ajam and Aron (2007), this improvement in South Africa’s public finances has been 
due to the creation of transparent and constitutionally compliant intergovernmental fiscal relations, 
the improved quality of the data in question and better budgeting at all government levels. The 
reformed and efficient tax system has also been a factor. 
Importance of government in funding social spending 
Over the past 15 years, the South African government has been able to increase spending on social 
protection as a percentage of GDP,1 dedicate half of its expenditure to the social sector and, 
between 2000 and 2008, increase the number of beneficiaries by 350% (Durán-Valverde & 
Pacheco, 2012). According to Durán-Valverde and Pacheco (2012), the government used two main 
fiscal mechanisms to obtain these results: first, the reassigning of public spending in order to give 
more funds to social programmes and, second, the decreasing of public debt.2 The South African 
government achieved these results in the face of a restrained economic growth rate and weak gains 
in fiscal revenue. 
However, despite the gains made in achieving sound and sustainable fiscal policy after the 
precarious situation inherited from the apartheid state, there are some concerns about the 
increasing public debt that followed the 2008 financial crisis and the further fairly rapid rise in 
public debt that has occurred since then.  
Episode of increasing debt 
The most recent episode of rapidly increasing debt in South Africa was the 2008–2009 global 
financial crisis, alluded to above, which led many governments across the world to focus on 
maintaining and even increasing their expenditure in the face of declining revenues. In South 
Africa, this move resulted in a widening of the fiscal deficit to 5.2% of GDP in 2012–2013 
(National Treasury, 2013). According to the 2011/2012 Debt Management Report, published by 
the National Treasury, South Africa’s national government debt was R1.2 trillion as of 31 March 
2012 (National Treasury, 2012). This translated into a total government indebtedness of 46.6%, as 
a percentage of GDP.    
                                                             
1 “Public Expenditure on the social sector in 2008 accounted for 15.3 per cent of GDP and 50.9 per cent of total 
public spending” (Durán-Valverde & Pacheco, 2012:131).    
2 “Total public debt fell from 49.5 per cent of GDP in 1996 to 29.5 per cent in 2009” (Durán-Valverde & Pacheco, 
2012:128)    
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This worrying increase in South Africa’s public debt has not improved much over the years. In 
fact, public debt-to-GDP has been steadily rising year-on-year since 2012 and is currently over 
50% of GDP.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that South Africa recently saw its sovereign debt being 
downgraded by all three major credit rating agencies. Downgrades raise the cost of borrowing and 
servicing debt and therefore represent a further challenge to fiscal sustainability.   
Factors contributing to rapid public debt increase  
In the main, the increase in South Africa’s government debt is a function of low growth; the 
mismanagement of state-owned entities (SOEs); governance issues at the South African Revenue 
Service (SARS), which has affected tax revenue collections; the increased costs of borrowing and 
servicing of debt associated with three sovereign downgrades; the general erosion of the 
institutional framework, which depletes investor confidence and thus investment; and finally, high 
public sector wages, which are a pressing issue. All of these variables interact at the macro level 
and eventually take a toll on the country’s public finances.  
South Africa has experienced very slow growth in the period following the global financial crisis. 
The average growth rate between 2009 and 2017 was a meagre 1.63% (see Figure 3), which has 
contributed to the country’s deteriorating public debt dynamic.  
Figure 3: Annual GDP growth rate – South Africa 
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generates extra risk for, the fiscus. This threat is affirmed by the recent Nugent Commission of 
Inquiry, which found that the restructuring that has happened limits coordinated action, to the 
benefit of “delinquent taxpayers” (Nugent, 2018). The increasing cost of borrowing and servicing 
debt is directly linked to the recent sovereign downgrades, which in turn are tied to poor 
governance. Moody’s (2017), for instance, cited the fact that “the institutional framework has 
become less transparent, effective and predictable” as one reason for its downgrading of South 
Africa’s sovereign rating. This weakened institutional framework no doubt plays an important role 
in increasing debt levels. Linked to this is the importance of strong institutions for investor 
confidence and therefore growth.  
Finally, another key fiscal risk for the South African government is the wage bill. The public sector 
wage bill has been increasingly crowding out other areas of expenditure. Between the 2008–2009 
and 2015–2016 financial years, national and provincial government salaries have nearly doubled 
(National Treasury, 2017b), contributing further to increasing debt levels.  
The South African government should therefore tread carefully. Studies have shown that running 
large fiscal deficits has the potential to hamper economic growth, cause inflation and affect general 
macroeconomic performance through a crowding-out of private investment (Elliot & Kearney, 
1988). This is a view supported by Calitz et al. (2009; 2013), who note that the past few decades 
have provided sufficient evidence of the harmful effects that running huge fiscal deficits has on 
macroeconomic performance. As noted earlier, if fiscal policy is not seen to be sound, it is likely 
to lead to foreign capital outflows (Ajam & Aron, 2007).  
However, as pointed out by Cecchetti et al. (2010), high public debt does not necessarily mean 
that a country’s fiscal policy is unsustainable. The authors state that, post-World War II, many 
industrialised economies experienced much higher levels of debt than are seen today and that, 
more recently, Japan has had a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 150% without any negative impact on 
its borrowing costs (Cecchetti et al., 2010). Their argument is that as long as market mechanisms 
continue to place their faith in the ability of these industrialised economies to repay their 
obligations (which has been the case in Japan, for example), then reservations about debt are 
overstated. 
Nonetheless, the South African government should remain cautious. Even though market 
mechanisms may not adjust sovereign debt yields or interest rates with regard to more 
industrialised countries, it is not clear that the same investors would be willing to do this for South 
Africa. Indeed, the signs suggest that this would not be the case. For example, in 2016, 
Futuregrowth Asset Management (Futuregrowth) announced in a note that the company would be 
suspending additional loans to some of South Africa’s large SOEs (Futuregrowth, 2016). In 
explaining its decision, the company cited concerns around decision-making and governance in 
these specific SOEs.  
Moreover, another one of the reasons given by Moody’s for its downgrading of South Africa’s 
sovereign debt was the decline in the country’s debt metrics and revenue prospects. This suggests 
that the market would adjust its perceptions accordingly. The next section reviews the literature 
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on the effects of institutional strength on economic growth and, by implication, fiscal policy 
sustainability.  
3. Literature review 
The first piece of empirical research that focused on the subject of public debt was written by 
Domar in 1944. On account of this seminal paper, titled “The Burden of the Debt and the National 
Income”, Domar is widely regarded as the pioneer of the mathematical treatment of the public debt 
question.  
Domar’s (1944) main goal in the paper was to contrast the two main schools of thought on public 
debt. The first view, critical of or opposed to deficit financing, maintained that a sustained deficit 
spending leads to ever-increasing public debt and that the servicing of debt will require an increase 
in taxes over time. The alternative view maintained that the debt problem should be addressed in 
relation to GDP. The argument was that, with a growing economy, the burden is likely to be within 
manageable limits.  
The main finding of this important research study was that the problem of debt can be solved by 
growing national income, which increases GDP. Furthermore, Domar (1944) states that, in order 
to grow GDP, there has to be an increase in the volume of monetary expenditure (i.e., demand-
side spending) and, in order to avoid inflation, the spending must result in increased productivity. 
Domar’s main takeaway is that instead of worrying about debt, effort should be spent trying to 
find ways of achieving a growing GDP, which would be a far better outcome for the “benefit and 
well-being of humanity” and a solution to the debt problem. As early as the 1940s, then, there have 
been debates around the issue of fiscal policy sustainability.  
Since Domar’s ground-breaking early work, there has been a multitude of empirical studies that 
have focused on the sustainability of governments’ fiscal policy in developed countries (Hamilton 
& Flavin, 1986; Elliot & Kearney, 1988; Blanchard et al., 1990; Bravo & Silvestre, 2001; Afonso 
& Rault, 2009; Cecchetti et al., 2010; Bi, 2017).  
In order to distinguish empirically between two views on the limitations of government borrowing, 
Hamilton and Flavin (1986) tested the present-value government borrowing constraint, which 
states that the present value of future primary surpluses are equal to the present value of the stock 
of debt. To test for sustainability in the US’s fiscal deficit, they employed a methodology 
developed by Flood and Garber (1980), which was developed to test for bubbles in asset prices.  
According to one view on the limitations of government borrowing, nothing precludes the 
government from running a permanent budget deficit, paying interest due on the increasing debt 
burden simply by issuing more debt. The second view holds that creditors would be unwilling to 
purchase the newly issued government debt unless the government in question made a sincere 
guarantee that it would balance its budget in present value terms. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) 
found the suggestion that a government must make a commitment to creditors to balance its budget 
in expected present-value terms to be largely consistent with postwar US data. In other words, to 
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ensure that US debt would be considered sustainable, the US government committed itself to 
balance its budget in present-value terms.  
Similarly, Elliot and Kearney (1988) applied the methods used by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and 
MacDonald and Speight (1987) when testing for bubble financing of the fiscal deficit in Australia 
for the period 1953/1954–1986/1987. They developed the methods by allowing for the effects of 
income growth on sustainability and they also critically evaluated some of the methods used in 
previous literature. They found that, over the assessed period, there was no evidence of the 
unsustainability of government debt. Their analysis suggests that seigniorage was used to pay for 
sustained fiscal deficits, and that the overall level of debt as a ratio of GDP fell over the period as 
a result of strong GDP growth and inflation.    
Following the papers by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) and Elliot and Kearney (1988), Blanchard et 
al. (1990) investigated this subject matter further by proposing a set of indicators of fiscal policy 
sustainability that were designed to assess the extent to which governments can maintain current 
tax and spending programmes without experiencing a continued increase in their public debt. 
These indicators were constructed and illustrated for a sample of OECD countries. Their finding 
was that fiscal policy must not be static and should rather be forward-looking.  Furthermore, the 
assessment of sustainability cannot always be limited to the medium term, but government’s 
commitments to specific programmes do have implications for fiscal policy that affect the future. 
Therefore, projected future pressures, such as those on social spending arising from population 
ageing, should be incorporated into any measure that purports to indicate underlying sustainability 
problems.  
In more recent years, one extensively used mode of assessing fiscal sustainability has been to test 
for cointegration between government revenues and expenditures, or else to test the public debt 
(appropriately discounted) or the deficit for stationarity (Bravo & Silvestre, 2001; Afonso & Rault, 
2009; Trehan & Walsh, 1988; Quintos, 1995).  
Trehan and Walsh (1991:207) applied the method that tests for the presence of a cointegrating 
relationship between expenditures and revenues, but they relaxed the requirement that 
expenditures and revenues be stationary in first-difference terms. Their objective was to “show 
that the cointegration test is valid as long as a quasi-difference of the net-of-interest deficit is 
stationary”. Furthermore, they showed a scenario where the real interest rate was not constant and 
where, as a result, the cointegration test was no longer valid. 
They also presented two applications of the tests mentioned. In the first test, they examined the 
US federal government’s budget data and found a stationary linear combination of the stock of 
debt and concluded that the deficit, net-of-interest, did not exist (Trehan & Walsh, 1991:222). 
They also found that the first difference of the stock of debt was stationary. According to the 
authors, these findings imply that this deficit process is consistent with sustainability but that the 
assumption of a constant expected real rate is a bad approximate of the data (Trehan & Walsh, 
1991). 
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In his 1995 paper, Quintos found that under a weak condition – specifically, one that allows the 
bubble term in the debt process to go to 0 at a slower rate – cointegration between revenues and 
expenditures is a sufficient condition for deficit sustainability. His article focused on testing 
whether US fiscal policy was consistent with intertemporal budget balance and whether there has 
been structural change in deficit policy.   
Also employing cointegrating tests, Bravo and Silvestre (2001) conducted a study of 11 member 
states of the European Union (EU) for the period 1960–2000. They tested for sustainability using 
an empirical analysis of cointegration between public revenues and expenditures as a ratio of GDP 
for these countries. Using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller unit root test for each of the countries, 
they concluded that the ratios of government revenues and expenditures may be regarded as 
integrated of order one or I(1) in all the countries. They also ran Engle–Granger cointegration tests 
for the 11 countries and generated results that also indicate the coefficients of the independent 
variable for each equation and country.  
Their results show that cointegration was not rejected at the 5% significance level for France, 
Austria, Germany and the UK as well as the Netherlands if the 10% significance level was 
included. A Johansen cointegration trace test was also run. Similar results to the Engle–Granger 
test were obtained, except in one instance where cointegration was rejected for France at the 5% 
level and for the Netherlands at the 10% level. The authors do, however, note that their results 
depended on the type of test ran and the sample they used. 
Using similar methods, Afonso and Rault (2009) also used stationarity and cointegration tests to 
assess the sustainability of public finances in the EU-153 from 1970 to 2006. They investigated 
past fiscal data to determine whether government debt was stationary and whether there was a 
cointegrating relationship between government revenue and expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
Their results showed that the essential requirement for fiscal policy sustainability, which is that 
the government debt must be integrated of order zero, was satisfied. Panel-unit root tests were used 
to generate the results (Afonso & Rault, 2009).   
Kalyoncu (2005) studied the sustainability of fiscal policy in South Korea, Mexico, the 
Philippines, South Africa and Turkey. In order to carry out this study, the author tested for a long-
run relationship between revenue and expenditure (including interest) payments. Cointegration 
approaches were used in the empirical analysis. Kalyoncu’s empirical results suggest that a unique 
long-run relationship exists for South Korea and Turkey, while the cointegration results suggest 
that Turkey’s and South Korea’s fiscal position satisfies the sustainability condition. For the other 
three countries, Mexico, the Philippines and South Africa, however, the results suggest that fiscal 
policy is unsustainable.  
It is clear from the literature on fiscal sustainability that many of the existing studies have focused 
exclusively on empirical evaluations and tend to centre on the US, Europe and other industrial or 
                                                             
3 The EU-15 is comprised of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
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advanced economies. Literature on African economies (and on less quantitative factors) in this 
subject area is limited. Some notable research that focuses on Africa includes studies by, among 
others, Lusinyan and Thornton (2009); Oyeleke and Ajilore (2014); Oshikoya and Tarawalie 
(2010); Calitz et al. (2013); and Ajam and Aron (2007). 
Oyeleke and Ajilore (2014) examined the sustainability of fiscal policy in Nigeria between 1980 
and 2010 in order to determine whether or not the Nigerian government has violated the 
intertemporal government budget constraint. The authors used an error-correction method of 
analysis and their results showed that Nigeria’s fiscal policy was weakly sustainable. Oshikoya 
and Tarawalie (2010), meanwhile, examined the sustainability of the fiscal policy of West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ) countries using a time-series approach (annual data) to conduct 
cointegration tests for the period 1980–2008. Their results suggest that fiscal policy was weakly 
sustainable for all the countries in the zone except for Sierra Leone. 
Cohen (1996) approximated the value of debt in African countries by looking at the debt-to-export 
ratio and concluded that fiscal policy was sustainable. On the other hand, Lusinyan and Thornton 
(2009), in their investigation of South Africa’s long-run fiscal sustainability, adopted a range of 
more modern unit root and cointegration methods for analysing data on government revenue and 
spending in the country from 1985 to 2005. They found that, allowing for structural breaks, South 
Africa’s government revenue and spending during this period were one-series and cointegrated, 
with the estimated long-run equilibrium relation confirming the presence of a weak deficit 
sustainability condition. 
Ajam and Aron (2007:1), in their paper, “review[ed] the policies and outcomes of South Africa’s 
fiscal reform since 1994 and explore[d] the main challenges that were raised”. They examined the 
performance of fiscal policy “by means of the trends of the main budget indicators, measures of 
cyclically adjusted fiscal stance, a comparison of budget projections and actual outcomes, the 
management and sustainability of debt, and finally, the contribution of fiscal policy to South 
Africa’s improved macroeconomic stability” (Ajam & Aron, 2007:2). 
Calitz et al. (2013) corroborated previous studies that have found South Africa’s fiscal policy to 
be sustainable since 1960. They achieved this by providing a perspective on the manner in which 
the country’s fiscal sustainability was maintained. Furthermore, their paper provides a projection 
of the fiscal outlook for South Africa based on a structural VAR model, and their results suggest 
that the discretionary fiscal decisions of 2007 and 2010 could pose a threat to sustainability. This 
scenario could be safeguarded against if the authorities respond as they have done in the past – 
that is, by checking large fiscal deficits and rapid increases in the public debt.   
It is therefore clear that there is no consensus among economic researchers on a standard and 
precise definition of fiscal sustainability. Researchers have used varying methods that are quite 
similar in scope to assess sustainability, and their research has mostly been focused on developed 
countries, with a limited number of studies focusing on emerging economies. African countries 
have scarcely been assessed. The competing theories on fiscal sustainability date back as far as 
Domar’s seminal work in 1944. An important takeaway from these studies is that the results have 
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varied in different contexts and there is still no consensus as to what makes a country’s fiscal 
policy sustainable.  
For example, many large and advanced economies such as Japan and the US run large debt-to-
GDP ratios but are generally considered sustainable, while there seem to be stricter criteria in place 
for developing nations. Why is this the case? It could be due to the presence of stronger institutions 
in the developed nations, and part of this paper will argue that institutions and a strong regularly 
framework are important criteria for assessing a country’s fiscal policy.  
For example, Cecchetti et al. (2010:1) argue that high public debt does not necessarily mean that 
a country’s fiscal policy is unsustainable. Their argument is that as long as the market continues 
to place its faith in the ability of these industrialised economies to repay their obligations (which 
has been the case in Japan), then reservations about debt are overstated. Nonetheless, countries 
such as South Africa still need to be careful. While investors have been willing to place their faith 
in countries like Japan’s future ability to pay, it is not clear that they would do the same for South 
Africa. As mentioned earlier, one of the reasons given by Moody’s for its downgrading of South 
Africa’s sovereign debt was a decline in the country’s debt metrics. This suggests that the market 
would adjust its perceptions accordingly. 
As observed above, the government’s intertemporal budget constraint is a measure that has been 
frequently used (Oyeleke & Ajilore, 2014; Domar, 1944; Elliot & Kearney, 1988; Hamilton & 
Flavin, 1986). This method states that a government’s initial debt level should be equal to the 
present value of future surpluses. Another measure that is used involves fiscal sustainability 
indicators (Blanchard et al., 1990). These indicators indicate the adjustment required to bring 
public finances back to a sustainable path. Finally, as mentioned, another extensively used 
method of assessing fiscal sustainability involves testing for cointegration between government 
revenues and expenditures, or testing the public debt (appropriately discounted) or the deficit for 
stationarity (see Hakkio & Rush, 1991; Quintos, 1995; Bravo & Silvestre, 2001; Afonso & Rault, 
2009; Oshikoya & Tarawalie, 2010).  
 
Importance of institutional strength for economic growth and fiscal discipline 
A review of the existing literature on fiscal sustainability shows how little focus is placed on “non-
tangible” metrics, which may have a significant impact on a country’s growth prospects and 
therefore ultimately on that country’s fiscal position. It is widely accepted that strong institutions 
– for example, a strong regulatory framework, adherence with the laws of the country, an 
independent judiciary, a working prosecutions system, and good governance – are fundamental to 
a country’s economic performance (Mauro, 1996; Buckberg, 1997; Mo, 2001; Abed & Gupta, 
2002). Institutions are also important because, by definition, they are the “rules” that govern human 
interaction, whether they be formal (official laws and regulations) or informal (customs, habits and 
expectations), and they therefore underpin the economic, political and social spheres.  
For example, there are potentially massive costs associated with corruption. Bribing government 
officials may lead to decisions that are not optimal for society and can exacerbate inequality, 
because those who can afford to pay bribes are at an advantage compared to those who cannot. 
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Tax evasion can lead to mistrust in a government and loss of foreign direct investment. There is 
therefore the argument that it is important in any analysis of fiscal sustainability to critically 
evaluate the role of institutions and their effect on economic growth. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that in order to maintain its history of sustainable fiscal policy, South Africa’s institutional 
framework must be strengthened again. This is because strong institutions and a culture of good 
governance will be important for maintaining the credibility of South Africa’s fiscal policy.  
Research that has been conducted on institutions seems to point to strong institutions being 
important for sustained economic growth (Mauro, 1996; Buckberg, 1997; Mo, 2001; Abed & 
Gupta, 2002). This is particularly relevant because a large part of the increase in South Africa’s 
public debt is due to the continued low-growth environment. The argument made is that strong 
institutions and a clear regulatory environment matter for economic success because these factors 
affect the level of investment and private sector activity.    
According to Mauro (1996), research has shown a negative effect on economic performance in 
cases where there is evidence of corruption, and policymakers should be paying attention to this 
phenomenon. For example, Mo (2001) found that a 1% increase in corruption levels reduces the 
growth rate by about 0.72%. The most important channel through which corruption affects 
economic growth is political instability, which accounts for about 53% of the total effect. They 
also found that corruption reduces the level of investment in human capital and also reduces the 
share of private investment. Similarly, Abed and Gupta (2002) argue that for countries to achieve 
better economic performance, they need sound policies and institutions.  
Similarly, Buckberg (1997) has argued that, in order to lay the foundation for economic success 
and achieve a successful transition in the Russia post-Soviet era, the Russian government needed 
to create an institutional and regulatory environment that would foster investment and promote 
new private sector activity. Today, while we can see improvements in the regulatory environment, 
it can be argued that Russia still has a fair way to go to in fulfilling its economic potential.  
In addition to the above factors, adherence with the laws of a country is fundamental for economic 
success. In order for businesses to function as intended, a clear legal framework needs to be 
respected and maintained. This argument is supported by Buckberg (1997), who states that there 
should be strong order in place if businesses are to successfully resolve disputes, for example. 
More generally, the IMF’s 1997 paper, “Good Governance: The IMF’s Role”, stipulated that 
countries would need to put in place broad institutional reforms if they wanted to establish and 
maintain private sector confidence (and therefore investments).  
Another important avenue through which poor institutional strength affects economic performance 
is tax revenue collections, which ultimately have an impact on a country’s fiscal position as a result 
of increased borrowing to finance the deficit for expenditure programmes. A number of studies 
seem to suggest that a tax system that is perceived to be corrupt can lead to tax evasion. For 
example, in Russia, the tax system was considered unfair due to tax preferences and an uneven 
application of its tax code. According to Buckberg (1997), this perception led to firms using 
sophisticated means of reducing their profits. In the author’s interviews with business leaders in 
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Russia, these leaders stated that “corruption involving tax inspectors further undermines tax 
compliance and collections”.  
Driving home this point, Lewis and Alton (2015) have argued that the fact that SARS officials in 
South Africa have generally been well regarded by taxpayers has likely contributed to SARS’ track 
record of excellent revenue collections. This argument is supported by the findings of Ajam and 
Aron (2007), who state that the efficient tax system in South Africa helped reduce debt-to-GDP in 
the early 2000s.   
Finally, weakened institutions can also affect a country’s growth potential and ultimately its fiscal 
situation through poor governance. If state institutions are deemed to not be credible, this has 
broader implications for a country’s fiscal policy. It should be acknowledged that governance is 
quite a broad concept and there is no single formula for good governance that can be applied in all 
scenarios.  
The World Bank (1994) defines governances as being “epitomised by predictable, open and 
enlightened policy making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of 
government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; 
and all behaving under the rule of law”. Kaufmann et al. (2010), meanwhile, state there is no 
consensus or single definition of what governance is. In their view, governance means the way 
that power is exercised, including how governments are elected, monitored and re-elected, as well 
as the ability of the state to implement policies and respect for citizens and institutions. Yousaf et 
al. (2016) describe good governance as the method through which economic and social relations 
are directed, which includes rule of law, transparency and accountability.  
The big question, then, is how governance affects the economic growth of a country. There are a 
number of different viewpoints here. The long-held consensus is that there is a strong and positive 
correlation between economic growth and the quality of governance (North & Thomas, 1996; 
Aron, 2000; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002; Gray, 2007). This dominant view broadly promotes 
reduced corruption, transparency in public sector and state institutions, property rights and rule of 
law and free markets. If most of these factors are in place, then economic growth is stimulated and 
there is potential for sustainably reducing poverty. It should be noted, though, that there is some 
debate on the effect of governance on economic growth. For example, according to Aron (2000), 
the evidence regarding the impact of institutional strength on economic growth is not 
straightforward, because there is no clear vehicle or channel through which institutions will 
influence economic outcomes.  
Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) proposed an empirical analysis that allows for a separation of a 
positive causal effect that goes from good governance to higher per capita incomes and a weak 
and negative causal effect in the opposite direction. According to the authors, the negative 
feedback suggests that improvements in the quality of institutions and governance do not occur 
merely as a result of economic development. The argument is that, as nations develop, higher 
incomes do not lead to demands for better quality of governance and institutions – rather, the 
opposite might happen.  
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Specifically, elites within a country might capture the private benefits available within a status quo 
of poor institutional quality. The authors cite East Asia’s crony capitalism as an example of this 
phenomenon (Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002). The authors refer to the phenomenon – “the undue and 
illicit influence of the elite in shaping the laws, policies and regulations of the state” – as “state 
capture”. They point to state capture as a possible reason for the weak and negative causal effect 
from higher per capita income to improved governance.  
According to Gray (2007), an important factor in solidifying the consensus on the links between 
growth and governance has been the quantification of measures of institutions, which has 
supported the basic insights of new institutional economics. Reiterating Aron (2000), Knack 
(2006) points out that there is still uncertainty around the role of governance and that aspects of 
both empirical and theoretical evidence have been contested by economists. Issues include 
concerns about the quality of data and the lack of detailed case studies of governance and growth 
in specific countries.  
It is therefore evident that, while the consensus view is that good governance is associated with 
improved economic performance, there are a number of dissenting views regarding its exact 
impact. Governance issues as they specifically relate to South Africa will be touched on later in 
this paper. The next section describes and sets out the theoretical framework for the present study.  
4. Theoretical framework 
An extensively used method or framework for assessing fiscal sustainability is a two-step approach 
that involves stationarity and cointegration tests (Trehan & Walsh, 1988; Quintos, 1995; Bravo & 
Silvestre, 2001; Kalyoncu, 2005; Afonso & Rault, 2009, Lusinyan & Thornton, 2009; Oshikoya 
& Tarawalie, 2010; Afonso et al., 2017).  
Bravo and Silvestre (2001) examined 11 member states within the EU during the period 1960–
2000. Their study excluded Greece, Spain, Norway and Sweden due to a lack of availability of the 
corresponding series for the entire sample (Bravo & Silvestre, 2001). As their first step, the authors 
applied the Augmented Dickey–Fuller unit root test for each of the countries and concluded that 
the ratios of government revenues and expenditures may be regarded as integrated of order one or 
I(1) in all the countries. Thereafter, they tested for sustainability using an empirical analysis of 
cointegration between public revenues and expenditures, as ratios of GDP.  
Cointegration tests were assessed applying the Engle–Granger cointegration test for the 11 
countries, and the generated results indicate the coefficients of the independent variable for each 
equation and country. The cointegration tests were not rejected at the 5% significance level for 
France, Austria, Germany and the UK as well as the Netherlands if the 10% significance level was 
included (Bravo & Silvestre, 2001). A Johansen cointegration trace test was also run, and similar 
results to the Engle–Granger test were found, except that cointegration was rejected for France at 
the 5% level and for the Netherlands at the 10% level. The authors note that their results were 
dependent on the type of test they ran and the sample they used (Bravo & Silvestre, 2001).  
21 
 
As discussed above, Afonso and Rault (2009) also used stationarity and cointegration tests to 
assess the sustainability of public finances in the EU-154 from 1970 to 2006, investigating past 
fiscal data to see whether government debt was stationary and whether there was a cointegrating 
relationship between government revenue and expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Afonso & 
Rault, 2009). The essential requirement for fiscal policy sustainability (namely, that government 
debt must be integrated of order zero) was satisfied by their study, confirming that these tests are 
indeed optimal for assessing sustainability.  
In a study focusing on South Africa, Lusinyan and Thornton (2009) adopted a “battery of” more 
modern unit root and cointegration methods to analyse data on government revenue and spending 
in the country from 1895 to 2005. These methods allow for the following: breakpoints that are 
determined “endogenously”, different breakpoints for different series, more than one structural 
break in testing for a unit root, and a VAR approach to cointegration. Lusinyan and Thornton’s 
(2009) results suggest that “allowing for structural breaks, South Africa’s government revenue and 
spending during this period were I(1) series and cointegrated, with the estimated long-run 
equilibrium relation supporting the presence of a weak deficit sustainability condition”.  
In a recent paper, Afonso et al. (2017) applied stationarity tests in their analysis of Portuguese-
speaking African countries’ (PALOP) economies.5 The tests were applied to external public debt 
as a percentage of GDP. The Augmented Dickey–Fuller unit root test was used across the sample. 
The authors applied the Zivot and Andrew testing method to guard against the potential existence 
of structural breaks in the underlying time series. An important point to consider here is that the 
unit root and cointegration tests that are usually used do not always reject the null of a unit root in 
the series and are not very powerful in small samples and, moreover, that these tests can be 
unreliable if there is reason to believe that a country has experienced a structural break in its fiscal 
policy over the period being examined (Lusinyan & Thornton, 2009). 
As a second step, Afonso et al. (2017) apply cointegration tests between public expenditures and 
public revenues (as percentages of GDP). The methods employed were the Johansen and Engle–
Granger tests. This two-step method has been the most popular method for assessing fiscal 
sustainability. I will now define the inter-temporal budget constraint (IBC).  
Based on previous studies that have been conducted, the derivation of the inter-temporal budget 
constraint begins with a simple-version, one-period budget constraint, which describes the 
progression of the net debt:  
Bt+1 = (1+r)Bt – PBt+1 
(1) 
Where Bt is the stock of debt, r is the interest rate and PBt is the primary balance (total government 
revenues minus total government expenditure excluding interest payments).  
                                                             
4 See footnote 5 above. 
5 This community of countries comprises Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé and 
Príncipe.  
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If we solve for the constraint going forward in time, we have the following: 
Bt = (1+r)
-1 Bt – (1+r)-1PBt+1 
(2) 
Bt = (1+r)
-2 Bt+2 – (1+r)-2PBt+2 + (1+r)-1PBt 
(3) 
Bt = (1+r)
-n Bt+n  + Σn i=1 (1+r)-iPBt+i 
(4) 
If the limit is taken as it tends to infinity, we have the following: 
Bt = lim(n →∞) (1+r)-n Bt+n + Σ∞ i=1(1+r)-iPBt+I 
(5) 
An important assumption is that the first term (the present value of the government debt in infinity) 
is equal to zero: 
lim(n →∞) (1+r)-n Bt+n = 0 
(6) 
This is the transversality condition of the no-Ponzi game condition. By substituting the above 
term into the IBC, we have the following: 
Bt = Σ∞ i=1 (1+r)-i PBt+I                                                       
(7) 
The IBC tells us that the present value of future primary balances must be equal to the present 
value of the stock of debt. This is the no-Ponzi game condition. A Ponzi game would be a scenario 
where a country always pays interest by issuing more debt. The relevant sustainability test is then 
conducted to establish if past fiscal data is likely to result in the IBC being contravened (Chalk & 
Hemming, 2000). If the IBC condition is found to have been violated, this implies that fiscal policy 
is considered unstainable.  
Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Wilcox (1989) have modified the IBC test and proven that a 
stationary quasi-difference of primary deficit Dt ~ Θ. Dt ~ I(0) is sufficient for the transversality 
condition to hold, if and only if debt and primary deficit are cointegrated (Dt, Bt-1).  
Therefore, from Equation (1), and assuming the interest rate is constant, it can be written as: 
Bt+1 = Gt - Tt + Bt + εt 
(8) 
This implies the following: 
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Bt+1 - Bt = Gt - Tt = Dt 
(9) 
Therefore, a typical cointegration regression estimation is as follows (Trehan & Walsh, 1991; 
Hakkio & Rush, 1991): 
Dt = -α Bt-1 + εt 
(10) 
With α>0, where Dt is the primary deficit.  
Trehan and Walsh (1991) and Hakkio and Rush (1991) provide a second modification of the IBC. 
This version demonstrates that the cointegrating relationship between government expenditure and 
tax revenue is a necessary requirement for the IBC to hold. It also assumes stochastic real interest 
rates.  
Assuming the interest rate is stationary, Equation (2) can be written as follows: 
PBt = GGt – Tt = Σ∞ j=1 δj=1 (∆Tt+j - ∆GGt+j + r∆Bt+j-1) 
(11) 
Where GGt = Gt + it Bt-1 is total government expenditure including interest payments and the debt 
outstanding with discount factor δ = (1+r)-1 and ∆ is the first differences. Due to the variables GGt 
and Tt usually being non-stationary, this equation provides a framework for testing sustainability. 
Therefore, fiscal sustainability implies that tax revenues and expenditures must be cointegrated if 
GGt and Tt are I(1) process.  
In line with Trehan and Walsh (1991), as well as Hakkio and Rush (1991), the equation that 
needs to be estimated takes the following form: 
∆GGt = α + Θ∆Tt + εt 
(12) 
The theoretical model says that the regression of the two-time series that are not stationary may 
result in a spurious regression being produced. Consider the time series of total government 
expenditure and revenues given above. Subjecting the time series of these variables to a unit root 
test individually, it may be found that they are integrated of order one or I(1) and therefore contain 
a unit root. Suppose the above equation is rewritten as follows:  
εt = ∆GGt – α - Θ∆Tt 
(13) 
Suppose now it is μt that is subjected to a unit root test and that it is found that it is stationary; it 
therefore means that it is integrated of order zero or I(0). Therefore, although total government 
revenue and total government expenditure have stochastic trends – that is, they are individually 
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I(1) – their linear combination is I(0). The linear relationship cancels out the stochastic trends in 
the two series.  
As a result, if total government expenditure and total revenue are taken as two variables that are 
I(1), the surplus (or deficit) – that is, total revenue less expenditure – could be I(0). Consequently, 
a regression of total government expenditure on total government revenue would not be spurious. 
It would be meaningful. Therefore, total government expenditure and total revenue would be 
cointegrated (i.e., the two variables have a long-term relationship between them).  
Shortcoming of the chosen methodology 
Before diving into the empirical analysis, it is important to note an important shortcoming of the 
chosen methodology. The fact that it does not incorporate the role of interest rates. Along with 
institutions is the important role of interest rates as mentioned earlier in the paper (pages 12 and 
17). Interest rate setting is closely linked to institutions and how countries are perceived. For 
example, we often see industrialised or developed economies with very low interest rates on their 
outstanding debt being able to manage it sustainably even at much higher rates as a result of the 
interest being low.  
This is a luxury developing countries unfortunately do not have to rely on. Therefore, while Japan 
or Italy may be able to manage public debt to GDP ratios exceeding 150% and being considered 
sustainable. South Africa with a public debt to GDP ratio of almost 60% would be considered a 
risk. This is something that the methodology fails to deal with adequately.  
5. Empirical analysis  
Data 
In this section, a descriptive summary of the data used is first provided, then unit root tests will be 
conducted and finally cointegration tests will be run in order to test for a long-run relationship 
between total government revenue and total government expenditure.  
I use annual data for the period 1961–2017 and, in particular, South African national government 
revenue and national government expenditure data, both as percentages of GDP. This data is 
obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). There is a total of 58 observations in the 
sample.  
Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive statistics of the total national revenue and the national government expenditure 
will be presented below. The statistics that will be shown include the graphs of each variable as 
well as the mean, median, standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis, maximum, minimum and 
Jarque–Bera for each of the variables. Following this, and as mentioned above, the next step will 
be to test the revenue and expenditure variables for a unit root using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller 
test. Thereafter, the Engle–Granger test will be used to test for a long-run relationship 
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(cointegration) between these variables. As stated earlier, if there is a linear combination between 
total revenue and expenditure, which are both I(1), then the linear combination is I(0), which 
implies that a long-run relationship exists because the linear combination purges the stochastic 
trend.  
Table 1 shows that the average national government revenue as a percentage of GDP between 
1961 and 2017 has been 20.80%, the average national government expenditure (also as a 
percentage of GDP) in the same period has been 23.94%, and the total national debt-to-GDP ratio 
in this period has averaged 37.89% – which would be considered a stable ratio today. The median 
values for these three variables are 21.80 for national revenue, 24.60 for national expenditure and 
38.60 for national debt (all as a percentage of GDP).  
The standard deviations of the three variables are 3.378% for national revenue, 3.650% for national 
expenditure and 6.765% for national debt, as percentages of GDP. There is therefore not much 
dispersion from the mean for all three variables, which seems to suggest that there has not been 
much volatility in the examined period for all three variables. The skewness of national 
government revenue is -0.500 and the kurtosis is 2.209; for national government expenditure, 
skewness is -0.497 and kurtosis is 2.505; for national debt, skewness is -0.025 and kurtosis is 
1.768. Skewness for all the three variables is less than zero, which means that the distribution is 
negatively skewed. The implication is that most of the values are concentrated on the left of the 
mean, with extreme values to the right. Conversely, all three kurtosis values are lower than three, 
which means that the distribution is platykurtic (flatter than a normal distribution). This implies 
that the probability for extreme values is less than it would be for a normal distribution and that 
the values are spread widely around the mean.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics – National revenue to GDP, national expenditure to GDP, debt to 
GDP 
 National government 
revenue (% of GDP) 
National government 
expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
National government 
debt (% of GDP) 
Mean 20.80 23.94 37.89 
Median 21.80 24.60 38.60 
Maximum 25.90 30.20 50.60 
Minimum 13.80 15.80 26.00 
Standard deviation 3.378 3.650 6.765 
Skewness -0.500 -0.497 -0.025 
Kurtosis 2.209 2.505 1.768 
Jarque–Bera 3.859 2.930 3.668 
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Figure 4: Trends in national revenue and expenditure (1961–2017)  
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank; KBP4433J – National Revenue (% of GDP) and KBP4434J – National 
Expenditure (% of GDP)  
Figure 4 shows that both national government revenue and national government expenditure have, 
in the main, generally trended upwards, with the exception of the post-1995 to early 2000s period. 
National expenditure, while there is a clear upward trend, appears to be more cyclical. Based on 
the trends seen in the figure above, these series would be expected to be non-stationary. The unit 
root tests that have already been discussed above will be conducted in order to test for this.  
In contrast, South Africa’s debt does not seem to exhibit a clear trend when looking at the same 
period (1961–2017). The debt-to-GDP ratio seems to have largely revolved around the 40% mark 
over the period – in line with the mean of 37% mentioned above. It should be noted, though, that 
following the steady decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio between 1999 and 2008, the debt-to-GDP 
ratio has been growing exponentially since 2009 – which is a cause for concern. These trends are 
shown in Figure 5 below.   
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Figure 5: Trends in national debt (1961–2017)  
 
Unit root tests (Augmented Dickey–Fuller) 
Next, we progress to conduct unit root tests and cointegration tests, in order to test for a long-run 
relationship between total government revenue and total government expenditure in South Africa. 
Our null hypothesis (Ho) states that revenue and expenditure – which are our variables of interest 
– are not stationary or do have unit roots. Our alternative hypothesis (H1) states that the variables 
are stationary (i.e., do not have unit roots).  
In testing for unit roots, if we find that the p-value is less than 5%, we reject the null hypothesis, 
meaning the particular variable is stationary. If the p-value is more than 5%, we do not reject the 
null, and the variable is non-stationary. Furthermore, looking at the test statistics and critical values 
as absolute values, we either reject or accept our null hypothesis. If the test statistic is less than the 
critical values, you cannot reject the null and we accept it. 
Level terms  
Unit root tests are performed in level terms – with an intercept; with an intercept and a trend; and 
with no intercept or trend – for both national government revenue and national government 
expenditure (both as percentages of GDP). See Table 2 below.  
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Table 2: Unit root tests in level terms (Augmented Dickey–Fuller)   
 National government revenue (% of 
GDP) 
National government expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
 No 
intercept 
Trend and 
intercept 
None No 
intercept 
Trend and 
intercept 
None 
[Prob. 
value] 
0.5819 0.1902 0.9716 0.4048 0.3119 0.9621 
Test 
statistic 
-1.3877 -2.8384 1.5952 -1.7424 -2.5327 1.4515 
Test 
critical 
values @ 
1% level 
-3.5526 -4.1305  -2.6069 -.35526 -4.1305  -2.6069 
Test 
critical 
values @ 
5% level 
-2.9145 -3.4921 -1.9467 -2.9145 -3.4921 -1.9467 
Test 
critical 
values @ 
10% level 
-2.5950 -3.1748 -1.6130 -2.5950 -3.1748 -1.6130 
Based on all three expressions of the unit root equations, we can see that South Africa’s national 
government revenue series contains a unit root and is not stationary. The p-value is 0.5819 when 
no intercept is included (which is greater than 5%), meaning that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis and that national revenue has a unit root. Similarly, the p-values for the other 
specifications (with trend and intercept, and without trend or intercept) are also greater than 5%, 
meaning that we do not reject the null hypothesis.  
Looking at the test statistic values for all three specifications, we also do not reject the null 
hypothesis for all three. Test statistic values of -1.3877, -2.8384 and 1.5952 are all smaller or less 
than their associated critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Similar to the national revenue 
described above, based on all three expressions of the unit root equations, South Africa’s national 
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government expenditure series contains a unit root and is not stationary. The p-values – with an 
intercept; with a trend and an intercept; and with no trend or intercept – are greater than 5%. 
Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that national expenditure has a unit root (see p-
values in Table 2 above). If we look at the unit root test (in levels) with no intercept, the test 
statistic is -1.7424, which is less than the critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (-3.5526, -
2.9145, and -2.59503). Therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis: revenue has a unit root. 
The same scenario occurs when we assess unit roots with trends and intercept and with no trend 
or intercept, as shown in Table 2.     
Unit root tests are now performed in first-difference terms – with an intercept; with an intercept 
and a trend; and with no intercept or trend – for both national government revenue and national 
government expenditure (both as percentages of GDP). See Table 3 below. The null hypothesis of 
all three tests assumes that the first differences of national revenue and national expenditure have 
unit roots.  
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Table 3: Unit root tests in first-difference terms (Augmented Dickey–Fuller) 
 National government revenue (% of 
GDP) 
National government expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
 No 
intercept 
Trend and 
intercept 
None No 
intercept 
Trend and 
intercept 
None 
[Prob. 
value] 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Test 
statistic 
-7.4223 -7.4092 -7.0123 -6.5932 -6.5621 -6.3625 
Test 
critical 
values @ 
1% level 
-3.5550 -4.1338  -2.6076 -3.5550 -4.1338  -2.6076 
Test 
critical 
values @ 
5% level 
-2.9155 -3.4936 -1.9468 -2.9155 -3.4936 -1.9468 
Test 
critical 
values @ 
10% level 
-2.5955 -3.1756 -1.6129 -2.5955 -3.1756 -1.6129 
Whether testing for a unit root in first-difference terms with no intercept, with a trend and intercept, 
or with neither, the p-value is less than 5%, which means that we can reject the null hypothesis 
that says that the first difference of national revenue does not have a unit root. This means that the 
first difference of national revenue is stationary. Similarly, the test statistic, for all three 
expressions, is greater than the critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, meaning that, based 
on the results, we can reject the null hypothesis. The first difference of national revenue does not 
have a unit root and is stationary.  
Following the same steps as were used for national revenue, unit root tests were applied in first-
difference terms for the national government expenditure (with no intercept; with a trend and 
intercept; and with neither). Similar results were found. The p-value is less than 5%, which means 
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that we can reject the null hypothesis that says that the first difference of national expenditure has 
a unit root. This means that the first difference of national expenditure does not have a unit root 
and is stationary. Furthermore, the test statistic, for all three expressions, is greater than the critical 
values at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, meaning that, based on the results, we can reject the null 
hypothesis. The first difference of national expenditure therefore does not have a unit root and is 
stationary.  
In the next step, we conduct cointegration testing between the national government revenues and 
expenditures (as percentages of GDP), an approach that was also followed by Trehan and Walsh 
(1988); Kalyoncu (2005); Afonso and Rault (2009); Lusinyan and Thornton (2009); and Afonso 
et. al. (2017). The Engle–Granger test performs a unit root on the residuals of the regression as a 
proxy for the error term, which is a linear combination of the variables in the regression.  
As can be seen above, we have used the Augmented Dickey–Fuller test in order to test the 
stationarity of the underlying time series. Both the national revenue and the national expenditure 
time series are not stationary in level terms, but they were found to be stationary in first-difference 
terms (i.e., they are I(1)). 
For the Engle–Granger test, our null hypothesis (H0) is that the residual series has a unit root (i.e., 
the residuals are non-stationary). In other words, there is no cointegration between the variables 
(national government expenditure and national government revenue). As stated earlier, if the 
residuals of the regression between the two variables of interest are subjected to a unit root test 
and it is found that they are stationary, it means that the residuals are integrated of order zero or 
I(0). Therefore, although total government revenue and total government expenditure have 
stochastic trends – that is, they are individually I(1) – their linear combination is I(0). The linear 
relationship cancels out the stochastic trends in the two series. Furthermore, the regression of a 
nonstationary time series or another nonstationary time series may cause a spurious regression, 
which is not desirable. In this case, we have two variables – national government revenue and 
national government expenditure – and they have a unit root in level terms but are stationary in 
first-difference terms.  
If we were to run a regression model with these two nonstationary variables, the regression may 
be spurious or false. The symptom or indicator of a spurious regression is that the r-square value 
is greater than the Durbin–Watson statistic. However, if the residual of the regression equation is 
found to be stationary, then the model is not spurious. This would also mean that the two variables 
are cointegrated or that there is a long-run relationship between them. Below are the results of a 
least squares equation with dependent variable being the deficit and the independent variables are 
revenue and expenditure.  
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Table 4: Least squares equation with deficit as dependent variable  
Sample: 1961 to 2018 
Observations: 58  
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
Revenue 1.000000 1.28E-14 7.84E+13 0.0000 
Expenditure -1.000000 1.17E-14 -8.54E+13 0.0000 
C -2.19E-14 1.29E-13 -0.169242 0.8662 
 
We can see from the results of the table above that the negative constant is not statistically 
significant. We can therefore reject the null hypothesis that the residuals have a unit root. Whilst 
a negative constant exists, it is not significant and does not suggest a stationary fiscal deficit.   
Table 5: Unit root of the residual series (Engle–Granger) 
 Residuals of the estimated revenue and expenditure equation 
 No intercept Trend and 
intercept 
None 
[Prob. value] 0.0050 0.0260 0.0002 
Test statistic -3.8026 -3.7675 -3.8395 
Test critical values @ 1% 
level 
-4.008 -4.008 -4.008 
Test critical values @ 5% 
level 
-3.398 -3.398 -3.398 
Test critical values @ 10% 
level 
-3.087 -3.087 -3.087 
 
The Engle–Granger critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are equal to 4.008, 3.398 and 3.087, 
respectively. This means that the t-stat is greater than the Engle-Granger critical values at the 5% 
and 10% levels; therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis. The residuals of the estimated 
equation do not have a unit root and are stationary. The regression is thus not spurious, and national 
government revenue and national government expenditure are cointegrated. A long-run 
relationship does exist between revenue and expenditure. Consequently, based on these tests, 
which are consistent with the outlined theoretical and empirical literature, we find results that 
suggest that fiscal policy is sustainable in South Africa. 
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Other fiscal risk factors that South Africa needs to address 
In this last part, the argument is made that in order for South Africa to maintain its recent history 
of sustainable fiscal policy, institutions will need to be strengthened again.   
This measure is necessary because, as already outlined in this paper, strong institutions are 
important for sustained economic growth, and a large part of the increase in South Africa’s public 
debt is attributed to continued low growth. Furthermore, governance issues at SARS have affected 
tax revenue collections, while mismanaged SOEs have added to South Africa’s fiscal risk.  
Strength of institutions and growth 
The perception of corruption in South Africa has affected investor confidence, and investment in 
the country has taken a knock as a result. As stated earlier on, some institutional investors have 
simply refused to provide new loans or invest in the country’s SOEs, as a vote against corruption 
(see Futuregrowth, 2016). A decrease in investment decreases the growth potential. The perceived 
corruption – in relation to the country’s investigative authorities and other arms of state – has 
played a significant part in the erosion of credibility in South Africa’s fiscal policy over the past 
half-decade or so.  
An important part of these perceptions is what has been termed the “state capture project”, which 
is currently being investigated by the Zondo Commission, headed by South Africa’s Deputy Chief 
Justice Raymond Zondo. The state capture project provides a conceptual framework for the “silent 
coup”. It has been argued that, over the course of this project, there was an extensive “repurposing” 
of government institutions, with the aim of redirecting rents away from development and into the 
hands of an increasingly confident power elite, with that power elite intentionally operating in 
extra-legal and anti-constitutional ways.  
Linked to the state capture project, and another key fiscal risk for South Africa, is the government’s 
wage bill. The public sector wage bill has, as mentioned, been increasingly crowding out other 
areas of expenditure. Between 2008–2009 and 2015–2016, national and provincial government 
salaries nearly doubled. Some have argued that the government is bloated due to patronage being 
extended and employees being rewarded with government posts as part of the broader state capture 
project. In 2017, all three major ratings agencies (Fitch, S&P and Moody’s) cited weakening 
institutional framework as a key driver for the downgrades that they issued. They also cited 
political uncertainty related to the March 2017 cabinet reshuffle.  
Coupled with the perception of corruption, the deteriorating economic environment has exerted 
huge pressure on South Africa’s public debt, due to the pressure placed on the government to 
finance its budget.  
 
 
35 
 
Governance issues at SARS and SOEs 
SARS announced an unexpected R30 billion shortfall in revenue collections in the 2016–2017 tax 
year – the biggest shortfall in budget estimates since 2009–2010, according to the National 
Treasury (2017b). The known issues at SARS do not bode well insofar as arresting the increasing 
public debt is concerned. To make matters worse, the collection of tax revenues has decreased 
across all categories besides dividends. Moreover, SARS is expected to miss its overall target for 
the 2017–2018 tax year by R50 billion. If we also take into account the collapse in skills in both 
the National Treasury and at SARS, the situation does not look promising. 
Acting Commissioner Ivan Pillay, Strategic Planning Risk Group Executive Peter Richer, Tax and 
Customs Investigations Heads Gene Ravele and Johann van Loggerenberg have all departed 
SARS, while the Director General, Lungisa Fuzile, the Deputy Director-General: Budget Office, 
Michael Sachs, and Andrew Donaldson, the former Deputy Director General, have all left the 
National Treasury (Pauw, 2017; National Treasury, 2017c; National Treasury, 2017d). This 
represents a loss of vital skills and deep institutional knowledge in the case of both institutions, 
which adds to the fiscal sustainability uncertainty. 
Substantial revenue under-collection in 2016–2017 has imposed sharper limits on public spending 
and has placed further pressure on government spending (National Treasury, 2017a). The proposed 
budget for 2017–2018 is equal to R1.56 trillion. The revenue is R1.41 trillion, which means that 
R149 billion is debt.  
Furthermore, financially distressed and mismanaged SOEs have the potential to weaken fiscal 
policy. The fact that contingent liabilities6 are excluded from the national government debt means 
that this is an area that the country needs to correct sooner rather than later. There has been an 
increase in the total guarantees issued to public institutions by the South African government. In 
2015–2016, the guarantees were R469.9 billion, and by 2016–2017 they had increased by R7.8 
billion (to R477.7 billion). Over the same period, exposure (or the amount that SOEs have 
borrowed against their guarantee) is expected to rise by R52.5 billion. The changes in this regard 
were driven mainly by Eskom, but SAA, the South African National Roads Agency Limited 
(SANRAL) and the South African Post Office also contributed.  
The contingent liabilities and risks associated with South Africa’s SOEs were cited by all three 
major ratings agencies as a reason for their 2017 sovereign downgrades. Increasing public debt 
undermines fiscal stability; increasing debt that is coupled with poor governance is even worse, 
because it triggers credit ratings downgrades. Government debt currently stands at R2.2 trillion or 
about 50.7% of GDP, with interest payments continuing to grow rapidly (National Treasury, 
2017a). Debt-service costs, which were about R162 billion in 2017–2018, are the fastest growing 
element of the budget. This is problematic because it diverts critical resources away from critical 
areas. To put it otherwise: For every R1 collected in tax, 13c goes to servicing the debt.  
                                                             
6 These are the outstanding financial liabilities of public entities, such as SOEs and other private companies, whose 
debt carries an explicit guarantee on the part of the national government.  
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6. Conclusion   
Although the empirical results of this study suggest that South Africa’s fiscal policy is sustainable, 
it must be noted that a level of fiscal risk remains, as a result of the country’s burgeoning public 
debt. This risk is amplified by the sluggish growth rate that the country has achieved over the past 
few years. The South African government should therefore still be restrained going forward. As 
Figure 5 above makes clear, debt is increasingly fairly rapidly, and if this trend continues, there 
could be grave consequences for South Africa.  
If the government still wants to implement some of its goals – including new policy initiatives 
such as national health insurance (NHI) and fee-free tertiary education – then the economy will 
need to start growing at a much faster pace over the next decade or so. If this outcome is realised, 
the expanded vocational education programme will be affordable with limited adjustments to tax 
policies (Gordhan, 2013). The implication, however, is that if faster economic growth is not 
achieved, then policies such as free education will not be affordable, which should be a cause for 
concern. 
The funding of free education is not the only concern. Important adjustments to the pension system 
structure are due to take place. According to the IMF (2010), the pensionable age for men in South 
Africa is being reduced to bring it in line with that for women. In addition, Durán-Valverde and 
Pacheco (2012) state that, according to forecasts, there is going to be a steady increase in people 
who are over the age of 65 in the next 15 years. This should raise alarm bells for the South African 
authorities, as it would mean more commitments for the government. Added to that is the risk of 
default by the country’s SOEs, which are on the brink of collapse. All of these factors add 
significant risk to South Africa’s fiscal policy.  
Calitz et al. (2013) argue that the various threats to the prospect of continuing fiscal responsibility 
all stem from the government’s pursuit of a developmental state trajectory. According to these 
authors, recent policy documents, such as the 2011 Budget Review and the New Growth Path, 
expose some likely features of the developmental state that they believe is being introduced by the 
government (Calitz et al., 2013). These features include the follow: increasing government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, associated with a higher average tax burden; greater 
regulation of the private sector (as is already the case with the health sector, according to the 
authors); and more control over financial relations across the different spheres of government, 
despite there being a federalist constitution in place (Calitz et al., 2013:18). The authors also state 
that dissaving7 is expected to amount to 1.5% of GDP, which implies continued use of borrowed 
money to fund current spending – a fiscal practice that is commonly seen to be unsound. 
Ajam and Aron (2007) also warn that the sustainability of fiscal policy in South Africa might be 
threatened if the fall in revenue collection and the risk arising from existing security entitlements 
are not carefully managed. It is argued that economic growth has not been sufficient to lower 
unemployment and decrease poverty and that, as a result, the South African government will 
continue to face pressure to increase existing cash-based entitlements (Ajam & Aron, 2007). This 
                                                             
7 According to Calitz et al. (2013:18), this is the difference between the budget deficit and capital expenditure.  
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view is echoed by Jibao et al. (2010), who point out that increasing tensions among the poor 
majority about abysmal service delivery could be a recipe for fiscal unsustainability in South 
Africa. Ajam and Aron (2007) raise a crucial point when they state that the political sustainability 
of policies is as important as fiscal sustainability. It is therefore the contention of this paper that 
while fiscal policy in South Africa is generally sustainable, the government should remain hyper-
aware of the fact that the country’s fiscal policy could easily move into unsustainable territory.             
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